I. Introduction
Are all emerging market economies (EME) crises alike? Yes and no. While countries have experienced balance of payments crises since time immemorial, the more spectacular "capital account" crises first came to the fore with Mexico's devaulation in December 1994.
Setting the stage for subsequent crises in East Asia and Latin America, Mexico's crisis was characterized by a sharp correction of the currency and the current account, together with a collapse of output and economic activity. Broadly similar outcomes were observed following Russia's 1998 devaluation cum default, Brazil's abandonment of its peg in 1999, and both But while the consequences of these crises show characteristic similarities (output and exchange rate collapse, sharp reversal of the current account as private financing is withdrawn, Figure 1 ), their causes appear bewilderingly different. Thus Mexico and Russia's crises stemmed from difficulties in funding the public sector. In Brazil (1998-99) , Turkey (2000-01) and Argentina (2002) public sector debt dynamics played a key role-in the latter two cases, accompanied by a banking crisis. On the other hand, Uruguay (2002) was a banking crisiscaused by withdrawals of Argentine deposits-that spilled into a public sector debt problem and a balance of payments crisis.
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Nor has the academic literature been particularly successful at developing a unified theory of currency crises. In the early models (Krugman 1979, Flood and Garber 1981) , the peg was undermined by the government money-financing its deficit. Following the European ERM crises in 1992/93, theoretical models focused on the possibility of multiple equilibria whereby a self-fulfilling expectation of policy loosening could engender a speculative attack (Obstfeld 1986 ). The East Asian crisis gave rise to yet a third generation of crisis models, these emphasizing balance sheet effects of unhedged foreign-currency debt exposure (Aghion et al. 2001 ). But Argentina's 2002 crisis harkened back to the first-generation models in which financing the budget is the root cause of the crisis (even though the currency board itself largely ruled out money financing the deficit).
All this suggests the need for a more unified approach to understanding "EME" crises (some of which, recently, have occurred in advanced economies). Drawing on earlier work by Ghosh and Ghosh (2003) , Ghosh, Kim, Ramakrishnan, and Zalduendo (2008) , this paper proposes a general framework for modeling crises-as the confluence of an underlying vulnerability plus a specific crisis trigger. The vulnerability is typically a balance sheet mismatch (maturity, currency, capital) that may persist for many years until a crisis is triggered by a particular event. Such vulnerabilities can therefore be readily identified. By contrast, the event that triggers the crisis may take many different forms-economic or political, domestic or external-and is likely to be highly unpredictable. If this view of crises is correct, then it has the important implications for crisis prevention efforts, namely that policy efforts should be directed at addressing underlying vulnerabilities rather than at trying to predict crises.
But while previous EME crises appear to fit this framework, actually testing the idea that crises are the confluence of underlying vulnerabilities and a specific trigger is difficult because the triggering event may be endogenous to the underlying vulnerabilities. Indeed, the recent theoretical models suggest that a small change in the balance sheet or liquidity position of a country may trigger a sudden stop if creditors are unable to coordinate among themselves (Morris and Shin 2006, Corsetti et al. 2006) . The recent global financial crisis-whose epicenter was advanced, not emerging market, economies-provides a natural experiment in this regard. If the crisis in advanced economies, including the consequent deleveraging by financial institutions, is taken to be the triggering event, then how EMEs fared during the crisis (2008-09) should be correlated to their pre-existing vulnerabilities (i.e., their vulnerabilities as of end-2007) . In this paper we use the global financial crisis to test whether countries that were more vulnerable indeed suffered larger output declines (relative to the country's historical growth performance) once the crisis was triggered. .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II elaborates on the analytical framework for considering crises as the confluence of an underlying vulnerability and a specific crisis trigger. In the absence of full sectoral balance sheets, Section III develops some simple indicators of vulnerabilities across key sectors of the economy. Section IV applies these indicators to identify underlying vulnerabilities in emerging market economies on the eve of the global financial crisis, treating the crisis (whose epicenter was the advanced economies) as the triggering event for the subsequent performance of EMEs during 2008-09. The key hypothesis is that EMEs that suffered the worst performance (i.e., experienced their own crisis in were indeed those that had underlying vulnerabilities. By contrast, EMEs that were hit hard by global financial crisis (through trade or financial links with advanced economies) nevertheless came through relatively unscathed if they did not have these vulnerabilities. Section V concludes.
II. Underlying Vulnerabilities and Crisis Triggers
Prior to the onset of the "capital account" crises of the 1990s, most analyses of financial crises focused on flow disequilibria-a budget or current account deficit that could no longer be limited ability to borrow in their own currencies ("original sin"), there must be FX-exposure in some sectoral balance sheet in the economy. This also means that any "hedging" will either be incomplete or that, in effect, the country is not a net recipient of capital from the rest of the world.
Therefore, the key to reducing vulnerability is to try to limit currency, maturity, and capital structure mismatches and ensure that risks-including to real shocks-are ultimately contained by strong balance sheets within the economy. 2 To use an analogy, lightning strikes might leave a house at risk of burning down and while measures can be taken to reduce that risk (e.g., installing a lightning conductor), some risk may be unavoidable. By purchasing insurance, however, the homeowner transfers the associated financial risk from his own relatively weak, undiversified balanced sheet to that of the insurance company, which is much stronger in that it holds diversified risks.
credible deposit insurance or lacks international reserves to provide liquidity support in foreign exchange. By the same token, if banks tighten their lending to prevent their portfolios from deteriorating, then this further complicates the situation of the corporate or public sector that is facing financing difficulties.
• If the government's balance sheet is sufficiently strong, it can serve as a "circuit breaker," halting the propagation of shocks across domestic balance sheets. In some crises (e.g., Argentina 2002), however, the government balance sheet was the main source of weakness, precluding such a role. Indeed, banks typically want to hold government securities as they may be the only liquid, domestic-currency denominated assets. However, if-as in Argentina-the government defaults on its debt, then this can be a source of vulnerability to the banking sector.
• Available foreign exchange reserves or contingent financing may be especially valuable in reducing the economy's balance sheet vulnerabilities as they can be used to cover short-term financing needs of the public sector, to provide a partial lender of last resort function in dollarized economies, or to help close the private sector's foreign currency mismatch-insulating the economy from the impact of a devaluation-by providing liquidity to banks. However for contingent financing to be useful, it must be very quickly accessible.
• Maturity and currency mismatches are sometimes hidden in indexed or floating rate instruments. For instance, liabilities may be formally denominated in local currency but linked to the exchange rate. Likewise, an asset may have a long maturity but carry a floating interest rate. Such indexation often creates the same mismatches as if the debt were denominated in foreign currency or as if the maturity were as short as the frequency of the interest rate adjustments.
• As was the case both in Thailand and in Argentina, balance sheet linkages can transform one type of risk into another without necessarily reducing that risk. For example, the banking system may try to close its FX mismatch on foreign currency deposits by lending to domestic corporations in foreign currency. However, if the non-financial sector recipients of those loans do not have natural hedges (e.g., have export revenues), then the banking system's currency risk is simply transformed into credit risk.
• Off-balance sheet items can substantially alter the overall risk exposure-reducing or increasing balance sheet exposures according to whether an underlying position is being hedged or the entity is taking a speculative position in the derivatives markets.
However, such transactions can also mask vulnerabilities, for instance as risk from a balance sheet mismatch is transformed into counterparty risk. In aggregate, a sectoral balance sheet may appear hedged through the derivative markets but may still be exposed to the risk if the counterparties are connected.
3 For example, in Turkey 2000,
the banking system open FX exposure was small when forward transactions were included, but the main counterparties in these forward transactions were other Turkish banks.
• The ultimate buffer for private sector balance sheet mismatches (e.g., currency/FX) is capital. A major source of vulnerability in the East Asian crises was the very high debt-equity ratios.
• Pegged exchange rate regimes, by offering an implicit exchange rate guarantee, might encourage greater risk taking in the form of open (mismatched) FX-positions. As noted above, to the extent that emerging market countries' ability to borrow in their own currency is limited, there must be aggregate foreign currency exposure associated with foreign liabilities (i.e., obligations to non-residents). Nevertheless, pegged exchange rates might exacerbate foreign currency risk: by providing an implicit guarantee, encourage more "carry trade" (arbitrage between low-cost foreign currency borrowing and higher domestic interest rates at a given exchange rate) resulting either in greater total foreign borrowing or a bias towards shorter maturity foreign liabilities (Thailand 1997), Turkey 2001/02).
Although mismatches may represent important sources of vulnerability, they do not imply that the country will necessarily experience a crisis. In particular, crises require some triggering event. Table 1 lists the major emerging market crises as well as the underlying vulnerabilities and (plausible) crisis triggering events. What is striking from the list is the similarity of the underlying vulnerabilities-and the dissimilarity of the specific crisis triggers.
The underlying vulnerabilities are nearly always maturity or currency mismatches on public or private sector balance sheets. By contrast, the specific event that triggers the crisis varies widely, including political uncertainty (Mexico 1994), external shocks (Argentina 1995 , Korea and Indonesia 1997 , Uruguay 2002 , and perceptions about policy inconsistencies or insufficient political will (Russia 1998 , Brazil 1999 , Turkey 2000 , Argentina 2002 ). 
III. Vulnerability Indicators
While balance sheet analysis can be revealing about potential vulnerabilities in the economy, it is also data intensive, requiring detailed information on sectoral balance sheets and their interaction. A simpler approach, therefore, is to create indicators of vulnerability that are broadly related to currency and maturity mismatches and that can then be related to crisis risk.
Definition of crisis
The first step in this exercise is defining the type of crisis for whose vulnerability we are trying to explain. We follow the crisis definition used in Chamon, Manassi and Prati (2007) , and consider capital account crises, which involve sudden stops in capital flows that are likely to be associated with currency, sovereign, banking, or corporate crises.
While there is no standard definition of a sudden stop, we define such episodes as a year in which one of the following holds (where means and standard deviations are computed based on the 1993-2007 values deflated by the U.S. CPI):
• net private capital flows/GDP have declined by at least 3 percent from the previous year and 2 percent from two years before; • or net private capital flows are at least 1.5 standard deviations below their mean and have declined by at least 0.75 standard deviation from the previous year;
• or net private capital flows have declined by at least 1.5 standard deviations from the previous year and at least 0.75 standard deviation from two years before; • or net private capital flows have declined by at least 0.75 standard deviation from the previous year and at least 1.5 standard deviations from two years before. Table 2 lists the resulting crisis episodes for the 50 countries in our sample. 4 4 This selection of the list of crises is the result of a concerted effort by the IMF Working Group on Vulnerability Indicators (WGVI) whose aim was to develop new criteria for rating countries' vulnerability. The following two-stage procedure was followed. A first set of potential crisis episodes was identified on the basis of various definitions of crises, including two measures of sudden stop in net private capital flows, years of high exchange rate pressure as indicated by Early Warning Systems (EWS), sovereign defaults, Fund programs (only years with positive net disbursements), a banking and a corporate crisis indicator. Second, the final set of crisis years was chosen taking into consideration comments from IMF's desk economists. Their suggestions helped resolve remaining ambiguities. 
Explanatory variables
There are many possible candidate explanatory variables for underlying vulnerabilities.
For each of the three "sectors" (external, public, financial), we consider five potential explanatory variables:
External: Reserve cover (dummy for reserves covering short-term debt and current account deficit), current account balance/GDP, external debt/GDP, external debt/exports, exchange rate overvaluation.
5
Fiscal: Public debt/GDP, public debt exposed to roll-over risk (short-term debt at remaining maturity/GDP), public debt exposed to currency risk (foreign currency denominated debt/GDP), government overall balance, and primary gap (difference between primary balance and the level that would stabilize debt/GDP).
Financial: Non-performing loans (NPLs) as a share of total loans, capital adequacy ratio, return on assets, private sector credit growth over previous year (change in private sector credit/GDP), and private sector credit growth over the previous three years.
Estimation Approach
Given the wide variety of candidate explanatory variables, any estimation will inevitably give rise to data mining concerns. The traditional approach would involve a "horse race" between variables to see which ones seem more relevant to be included in the explanatory set.
But there are a number of possible concerns. First, even a variable that performs weakly may still play a useful role complementing other variables (that is, a "weaker" predictor in isolation may still be more useful than a "stronger" predictor if it helps identify crises that are often missed by the other explanatory variables). Any horse-race exercise is prone to "over-fitting" concerns, and while the handpicked combination may perform well in sample, it could perform poorly out of sample.
Since our main goal is to identify whether underlying vulnerabilities can indeed explain the occurrence of crises, any use of a "hand-picked" regression that works well in-sample is 5 The exchange rate overvaluation measure is based on estimates from the IMF's CGER Macroeconomic Balance approach for countries covered by that exercise, and deviations from a long-term average (beginning in 1980) for countries where that estimate is not available. subject to the criticism that the approach is not robust. Instead, therefore, we consider (all) possible combinations of the explanatory variables. Specifically, we estimate a series of probit equations (for the probability of crisis), each time choosing one external, one fiscal, and one financial variable-yielding a total of 125 probit equations. We also consider regressions where only two of these three sectors are used, which yield an additional 75 combinations. The probits are estimated using data through 2006 to predict probabilities for 2007; below, these are used to see whether existing vulnerabilities helped determine how emerging market countries fared in the 2008-09 global financial crisis.
Estimation Results
Given the large number of probit regressions estimated, we present only summary information on the statistical significance of the explanatory variables. To this end, Table 3 reports the percentage of probit estimations for which each variable is statistically significant (at the 10 percent significance level or higher) and is of the expected sign. The results suggest that, of the external sector, it is real exchange rate overvaluation and the debt-export ratio that are most robustly related to underlying vulnerabilities; of the fiscal sector, it is the primary gap (the budget surplus required to stabilize the public debt ratio) and maturing debt; and of the financial sector, it is only the return on bank assets that seems to matter. In general, the external sector variables capture the most important vulnerabilities.
To what extent were EME's vulnerable on the eve of the global financial crisis? Over the past decade, many emerging market economies have strengthened their economic fundamentals through both structural reforms and improved policies. Nevertheless, in some countries, balance sheet vulnerabilities remained-and, for example in Eastern Europe, worsened-during this decade.
The framework developed above can help quantify these vulnerabilities. In general, crises are rare events, and in our sample (up to 2007), correspond to only 5.2 percent of observations. By 2008, EMEs were somewhat less vulnerable to crisis than in the past, with an average crisis probability of 4.6 percent in 2008 (compared to 5.2 percent for the sample through 2007). Of course, there was also variation across countries, and the 25 th , 50 th , 75 th and 95 th percentiles of the sample's crisis probabilities in 2008 were 2.6, 4.0, 5.6 and 8.8 percent respectively. The time series evolution of the sample's average crisis probabilities is plotted in Figure 2 , differentiating by region. The regional time series confirms anecdotal evidence of declining vulnerabilities in Asia (post-2000) and in Latin America, but increasing vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe (which peaked just before the global financial crisis triggered the EME crises). The average fitted probability for Emerging Europe was 5.7 percent, compared with 4.2 percent for Latin America and 3.3 percent for Asia. Note: Table reports the frequency at which variable had the "right" sign and was statistically significant at the 10 percent level or above. There are 175 regressions including all 3 sectors, 75 including only 2 sectors (25 for each sector pairing).
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IV. Vulnerabilities on the Eve of the Global Financial Crisis
Accepting the paradigm proposed in this paper (that crises are the conjuncture of an underlying vulnerability and a crisis trigger), and assuming that the financial crisis whose epicenter was in the advanced economies constituted the crisis trigger, we would expect to see a correlation between the extent of pre-existing vulnerabilities and how emerging market countries have fared in the past couple of years. Table 4 Of course, pre-existing vulnerabilities were not the only factor determining economic performance during the crisis: the external environment mattered as well. To this end, we add the change in the terms of trade (positive but statistically insignificant) and output growth in the country's advanced economy trading partners (positive and significant). Even controlling for these factors, the vulnerability index continues to be highly significant (Table 4 [2]).
The relationship between the vulnerability index and individual countries' performance during the crisis is shown in Figure 3 , where the strong correlation between vulnerability and the subsequent output decline is clearly visible. What is also evident from the Figure is that the Baltic states (and Ukraine) suffered disproportionately more than even their (very large) vulnerability would imply-but the regression results are not driven by these "outliers"
(excluding Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia still yields a coefficeint of -0.83*** on the vulnerability index). Notes: Growth change during crisis corresponds to GDP growth in 08-09 minus 03-07 average. 1/ Vulnerability index is the average fitted value for each country of the crisis probability averaged across 200 probits desribed in Table 3 . Growth of trade partners is the real GDP growth of partner countries (weighted by export share). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. A further factor affecting how EMEs fared during the crisis was the behavior of capital flows. The deleveraging by advanced economy banks and the general increase in risk aversion led to significant capital outflows from EMEs. Figure 4 and Table 4 ( column [3] ) shows that these capital outflows had a significant negative impact on the growth performance of EMEs during the crisis. The outflows themselves, however, seem to have been largely indiscriminate.
While there is a relationship between higher pre-crisis vulnerability and larger outflows ( Figure 5 , top panel), it turns out that this relationship is driven entirely by Latvia-excluding this observation, it is evident that the extent of capital outflows was largely unrelated to pre-crisis vulnerabilities ( Figure 5 , bottom panel). This is also borne out in some annecdotal evidence of large capital outflows from Korea and Brazil-not because investors were worried about vulnerabilities, but because the larger and more liquid markets in these countries allowed investors to pull out funds from them more easily.
Finally, Figure 6 plots the conditional relationship beween the output decline and the estimated pre-crisis vulnerability (i.e., controlling for the effect of other explanatory variables, including capital outflows). Consistent with the regression results ( 
Conclusions
Are all emerging market economy crises alike? Yes and no. Superficially, they differ markedly-ranging from public funding and sovereign debt crises to banking and corporate sector problems. But a more general framework-in which crises are viewed as the conjuncture of an underlying vulnerability and a specific trigger-can help explain the diversity, and similarity, of EME crises.
In this paper, in the absence of full sectoral balance sheet data, we develop some simple indicators of vulnerability that are likely to be related to foreign currency and maturity mismatches on domestic balance sheets. Since the precise interaction of the various sectoral vulnerabilities is unknown, we use robust estimation techniques. Using this framework, we are able to trace how vulnerabilities have evolved in different countries (and regions). Consistent with anecdotal evidence, we find that Asia and Latin America became more resilient in the runup to the 2008-09 global financial crisis, while emerging Europe become vulnerable. We then find a strong correlation between how emerging market countries fared during the global financial crisis and their estimated vulnerability on the eve of the crisis. Other factors were also at play--for example, Korea had low vulnerability but suffered large capital outflows as the global financial crisis unfolded (in part because its liquid markets provided easy exit to foreign banks trying to deleverage and reduce exposure to all EMEs)-but the pre-global crisis vulnerability is the most important determinant of how EMEs fared once the crisis had been triggered.
This way of viewing financial crises-as the conjuncture of an underlying vulnerability and a specific crisis trigger-also has important implications for early warning systems and crisis prevention. In particular, it implies that crisis prediction-"calling crises"-is a fool's errand because specific events that trigger the crisis (which can be domestic or external, economic or political) are likely to be impossible to predict. Instead, therefore, policy efforts should be directed at eliminating (or at least reducing) the underlying vulnerabilities-as the crisis cannot be triggered if there are no vulnerabilities. And indeed, this is very much the approach of current efforts at crisis prevention, such as the IMF-FSB's early warning exercise (see Ghosh et al. 2009 ).
